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The advance of computer technology that has greatly exceeded human 
computational capabilities makes the question of the artificial intelligence (AI) 
quite natural. If the rate of the progress is maintained, one might anticipate the 
existence of algorithms mimicking human thinking. Thinking, however, involves 
not only purely logical operations (enjoying high level of perfection today) but 
combines other elements of human activity such as joy, fear pain and, most 
importantly, human consciousness as well. Nowadays, the issue of the 
attainment of new knowledge by man is widely discussed by experts of a broad 
spectrum of scientific disciplines such as philosophy, logic, computer science as 
well as neuroscience. It seems that comprehensive understanding of the process 
of human knowledge is not possible without contributions of all these areas of 
scientific study. Presently, their combination is often referred to as cognitive 
science1. Contemporary epistemology points out to several different theories of 
knowledge, e.g., correspondence theory, coherentism and contextualism2. 
Ultimately, one needs to engage consistent epistemology in order to elucidate 
the viability of artificial intelligence. Although the Chinese Room argument 
proposed in 1980 by John Searle is considered to contradict the strong 
hypothesis of artificial intelligence, its validity still necessitates precise 
justification.  
The problem of human intellection has been of vital importance for 
philosophers since the times of antiquity. In particular, it attracted attention of 
medieval thinkers such as St. Thomas Aquinas insofar as it stood at the 
crossroads of the world material and immaterial3. Since it is human intellect that 
                                                 
1Cf. M. R. W. Dawson, Understanding Cognitive Science. Oxford: Blackwell 1998; C. P. 
Sobel, The Cognitive Sciences: An Interdisciplinary Approach, Mountain View, CA: Mayfield 
2001.  
2Cf. R. Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction,  Routledge 2003. 
3St. Thomas Aquinas, In II De anima, lect. 10, Summa Theologiae q.74, a. 4, ad 1., Summa 
Contra Gentiles II, 82. 
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is capable to infer the existence of God, the particular branch of philosophy that 
studies cognition, is for St. Thomas Aquinas of prime importance. Bearing in 
mind St. Thomas’ earnest desire to integrate any section of knowledge into a 
comprehensive description of reality, one rightly expects that the problem of 
artificial intelligence would have stimulated his penetrating reflection. However, 
scholastic philosophy did not cease to exert its influence as the life of St. 
Thomas came to a close. Despite of its practical extinction with the advent of 
modern philosophy (Descartes, Kant, Hegel), it enjoyed considerable revival in 
the 20th century (neoscholasticisim) through the works of such figures as 
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange OP, Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and 
Mieczysław A. Krąpiec OP in Poland. Although neoscholasticism sought little 
dialogue with contemporary science (quite lamentably), some thomists did 
attempt to approach philosophical problems of modern technology with the use 
of scholastic apparatus4. One of them is an American philosopher and social 
scientist, Frederick D. Wilhelmsen who undertook the effort to evaluate the issue 
of artificial intelligence from the point of view of  scholastic epistemology5 
although his advertence to the leading contemporary AI arguments seems to be 
rather limited. The use of the term “scholastic” points out to an extension of the 
Thomistic thought with the achievements of neoscholasticism. In particular, this 
regards the theory of a power of human intellect that is parallel to abstraction, 
namely, that of existential judgments6.  
This article aims to present Wilhelmsen’s line of arguments pointing out to 
the impossibility of artificial intelligence based on the fact that the existential 
judgment, responsible for the attainment of new knowledge, is unrelated to any 
essential content in human intellect and thus cannot be decomposed and 
analyzed by an algorithm. The novelty of this article’s approach consists in 
combining a classical theory of knowledge founded on the principles provided 
by St. Thomas Aquinas with current investigations in the area of human 
intelligence. The main difficulty of the approach lies in the fact that both 
scholastic metaphysics and epistemology will have to be accounted for in some 
detail in order to facilitate full comprehension of how Frederick Wilhelmsen 
dissects the problem of artificial intelligence. Since metaphysics studies being as 
being (ens qua ens), intuitively appealing examples will be somewhat hard to 
find for all that exists is all but one example and there is nothing beyond that 
exists. Despite of its metaphysical character, scholastic theory of knowledge 
                                                 
4Cf. W. A. Wallace, The Modeling of Nature: Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Nature 
in Synthesis, Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press 1996 or William A. 
Wallace, "From a Realist Point of View"', Essays on the Philosophy of Science, Second Edition, 
Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983. 
5F. D. Wilhelmsen, Reasoning and Computers, in Being and Knowing, Albany – New York: 
PCP 1995. 
6Cf. E. Gilson, L’etre et l’essence, Problemes et controverses, Paris 1948. 
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offers an important insight into the Chinese Room argument’s insistence on the 
radical irreducibility of semantics to syntax as well as to explain why human 
intelligence cannot be replaced by a machine.  
 
The strong hypothesis of artificial intelligence stipulates that the entire 
complexus of human mind is reducible to an extremely complex algorithm 
provided that sufficient computational power is at hand. This standpoint is 
antibiological insofar as it reduces human mind to plain formal activity unrelated 
to any biological processes. The proponents of this hypothesis maintain that if 
the algorithm mentioned above were ever constructed, it would exhibit typical 
characteristics of human intelligence. In order to provide experimental 
verification of a given machine, a somewhat subjective test was developed in 
1950 by Alan Turing wherein a person judges computer’s response to a given 
task in relation to a parallel “human” answer7. In case no substantial difference 
is detected, the machine is considered as conscious.  
The hypothesis of artificial intelligence was challenged by the famous 
argument of the Chinese Room, developed in 1980 by an American philosopher, 
John Searle8. In a nutshell, the argument relates to a mental experiment that 
employs a non-Chinese speaking person answering questions in Chinese with 
the help of translational rules but without inquiring into the meanings of the 
Chinese words. Consequently, he or she ends up executing a strictly defined set 
of algorithmic instructions and thus acts as a computer. Based on that, Searle 
concludes that computers do not perform any acts of understanding ergo they do 
not think. In other words, since the symbols are meaningless to the computer it is 
not intelligent. Its internal states and processes are purely syntactic and they lack 
semantics, that is, meaning. This leads to the conclusion that computers do not 
possess any intentional (meaningful) mental states. The core of Searle’s 
argument against the strong hypothesis of artificial intelligence hinges upon the 
inability to derive semantics out of syntax9. John Searle opts for the weak AI 
hypothesis whereby he admits the possibility of implementing algorithms in the 
studies of human brain function. Also, following contemporary research, he 
maintains that human intelligence is conditioned biologically, namely, that 
mental states emerge as a result of biological structure of the brain. Further 
developments of the Chinese Room argument, the Chinese Gym, employ 
attempts to simulate connectionist neural networks that “have many 
computational elements that operate in parallel and interact with one another 
according to rules inspired by neurology”10. Inasmuch as the Turing test for 
artificial intelligence is universally rejected today, Searle’s Chinese Room 
                                                 
7A.M. Turing, Computing machinery and intelligence, Mind 59 (1950) 236. 
8J. Searle, Minds, Brains and Programs, BBS 3 (1980) 450. 
9J. Searle, Is the Brain’s Mind a Computer Program? Scientific American, 262 (1990) 1 27. 
10J. Searle, Is the Brain’s Mind a Computer Program? Scientific American, 262 (1990) 1 22.  
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argument is considered as decisive against the strong hypothesis of AI11. 
However, neither the Chinese Room nor the Chinese Gym argument provide 
justification why the gap between syntax and semantics arises as it has been 
already signaled in the opening paragraphs.   
One of the adversaries of the Chinese Room argument, situated at the “right 
wing”, that is, objecting even to the weak AI hypothesis, is a famous English 
mathematician and physicist, Roger Penrose. His insight into the problem of 
artificial intelligence follows upon the investigation of the theory of quantum 
gravity. According to Penrose, this theory will reveal phenomena that cannot be 
represented in a form of an algorithm pointing to man’s ability to resolve 
problems outside of the power of formal logic systems such as knowing the truth 
of unprovable statements (quantum hypercomputation)12. Also, the celebrated 
Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem indicates that mathematics cannot be reduced to 
purely computational mechanisms13. Finally, Roger Penrose adverts to the 
question of judgments that is, in his opinion, proper to human intelligence and so 
far has firmly stood up against any attempt of algorithmization14. Interestingly 
enough, judgments of a very specific kind will play a central role in human 
cognition as explicated by the medieval master, St. Thomas Aquinas and his 
followers.  
 
At the outset of his reflection on artificial intelligence entitled Reasoning and 
Computers, Frederick Wilhelmsen invokes David Hume’s stand that “judgments 
concerning existence cannot be deduced from the conceptual content that goes 
into them, that existence cannot be the feedback of any juxtaposition of ideas in 
rational discourse”15. What Wilhelmsen points to in this quote suggests that 
“why the mind concludes as it does is not inherent in any content found in the 
mind and why the real exists is not reducible to anything in the real”16. This 
statement contains the gist of Wilhelmsen’s argument. However, before 
engaging in rigorious metaphysical analysis, the author presents several 
preliminary phenomenological considerations by adverting to the thought of a 
famous 20th century English thinker and mathematician, R. Buckminster Fuller. 
In particular, these considerations accent the newness of knowledge attained by 
man by means of integrative mechanisms.  
                                                 
11J. Kloch, Świadomość komputerów?, Tarnów: Biblos 1996.  
12R. Penrose, Nowy umysł cesarza, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, tłum. z ang. 
J.Amsterdamski, ss. 445-491. 
13A.M. Turing, On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem, 
Proc. Lond. Math. Soc. (ser. 2) 42, 230-265; correction 43, 544-546. 
14R. Penrose, op. cit., 452. 
15F.D. Wilhelmsen, op. cit., 170. 
16 ibid. 
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In his book entitled Utopia or Oblivion, Fuller makes a useful distinction 
between two operations of human intellect: differentiation and integration. Next, 
he notices that “the computer has already effectively eliminated man as 
differentiator, that is, a specialist, but it can never replace him as an 
integrator”17. According to Wilhelmsen, differentiation may be otherwise called 
analysis to follow the Aristotelian idea of “the resolution of reality back to its 
causes”18.  In this case, analysis is understood as something inherent in reality 
that can be known as a result of a formal inference and not a “fresh insight”. In 
other words, the conclusion following upon the analytic differentiation is based 
in previously given information and as such it can be programmed into the 
computer. Wihelmsen summarizes succinctly that “programmed questions are 
tactics dictated by an already fabricated strategy”19. This is best illustrated when 
the computer evaluates the moves in the game of chess based on the numerically 
given relative strengths of pieces and positions. Its ‘decisions’ draw from the 
rules of chess inscribed into the appropriate algorithm. In other words, there is 
no newness of knowledge for all that the computer achieves while deciding upon 
its moves depends on the previously given material.  
On the other hand, according to Fuller, the act of integration (synthesis) 
involves introducing complexities together with many variables and 
interrelations among them. He suggests that computers also integrate but only 
accidentally. As an example, he proposes to consider a computer executing two 
programs simultaneously such as playing checkers and backgammon20. Since the 
checkers algorithm is simpler than that of backgammon, there occur periods 
when the two are synchronized resulting in a momentary blockage interference 
due to the shortage of time for the resolution of both. At this point, the computer 
faces the need to solve a problem of priority that lies outside of the essential 
content of either game, namely, which move to make first. Whatever criteria it 
uses, they are not dictated by either strategy meaning that the conclusion is 
achieved accidentally with respect to both checkers and backgammon. In the 
proper sense of the term, integration is accomplished by the human mind as an 
act of synthesizing. To illustrate this, Wilhelmsen invokes Kant’s synthesis a 
posteriori where the predicate expresses what cannot be derived from the 
subject. Thus new knowledge arises based on non-reducible premises21. 
Similarly, one can refer back to the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas. Quoting 
Wilhelmsen directly one realizes that “the synthesis effected is not merely “dug 
out” of either premise analytically. The intelligence transcends the formal order 
                                                 
17F. Buckminster Fuller, Utopia or Oblivion: The Prospects for Humanity, New York: Bantam 
Books, 1969. Wilhelmsen invokes the context of Fuller’s discussion on pp. 12-79.  
18Aristotle, Metaphysics, II, 1 quoted by F.D. Wilhelmsen, op. cit., 171. 
19F.D. Wilhelmsen, op. cit., 172. 
20R. Buckminster Fuller, op. cit., 37 quoted by F. D. Wilhelmsen, op. cit., 173. 
21F.D. Wilhelmsen, op. cit., 174. 
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in and through the synthesizing act that posits the formal content as well as the 
conclusion”22.  
Although the above analysis diagnoses the existence of integration (synthesis) 
and its specificity with respect to differentiation (analysis), further consideration 
is necessary to elucidate integration nature. The important criterion, Wilhelmsen 
states, is that “analytic inferences, themselves formal, are anchored in a priority 
out of which they are actualized”23. For instance, Wilhelmsen compares analytic 
statements to Sherlock Holmes’ deductive way of deciphering the “drinking 
propensities of Watson’s brother from a close study of the latter’s pocket 
watch”. Synthetic conclusions, he continues, “are without any anchor in the past. 
They have no prior formal causes. They are not continuous but discontinuous 
with what preceded them”24. It is the effect that when two judgments are 
juxtaposed, a new existential unity arises following an intellectual act that 
transcends both premises. Inasmuch as the origin of this transcendence as the 
result of the said unity of premises may seem intuitively acceptable, its true 
source lies in its existential character. However, this issue can be fully 
comprehended only on the grounds of Thomistic metaphysics and epistemology 
that will be briefly outlined in the following section.  
 
The discipline of philosophy that is called metaphysics treats of things that 
are beyond physics. This is mirrored in the composition of Aristotle’s works 
where the book on metaphysics follows that of physics. This indicates that 
metaphysics should be studied after physics. As St. Thomas Aquinas states in his 
commentary to Boethius’ De Trinitate: “beyond physics; for we have to proceed 
from sensible things to those that are not sensible. It is also called first 
philosophy, inasmuch as all the other sciences, receiving their principles from it, 
come after it”25. Since according to St. Thomas Aquinas, science is the study of 
things in the light of their causes, metaphysics reaches to the ultimate cause of 
the Universe, Ipsum Esse Subsistens, that is, God. Metaphysics is the most 
general of all sciences for its object of study is being as being in abstraction from 
any specification (ens qua ens). The Aristotelian metaphysics yields three major 
compositions that are found in anything that exists: form/ matter (hylemorphic 
theory), act/potency and substance/accident26.  
The main accomplishment of St. Thomas Aquinas concerns the distinction 
between essence and existence. In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle states that 
what a man is and being a man is not the same, he does not regard the essence 
                                                 
22ibid. 
23ibid. 
24ibid. 
25St. Thomas Aquinas, In Boethii de Trinitate, q.5, a.1. 
26Aristotle, Metaphysics. 
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and being (esse) as really distinct in an existing thing27. This finds its source in 
the conviction of the Greeks that the cosmos has always been in existence. 
Consequently, it prevents the question as to why there is being at all and not 
nothing. The advent of Christianity instilled the idea that the Universe was 
created by an independent and totally free act of the Divine will and that the 
existence of all things is contingent28. St. Thomas Aquinas uses this observation 
to reflect upon the question of the causes of being to arrive at the conclusion that 
all beings come from God: “being qua being is caused by God himself”29. The 
contingency of things as well as their plurality led St. Thomas to conclude that 
the essence (essentia), that is by which a thing created is what it is, is really 
distinct from that, by which it is (esse)30. The distinction between esse and 
essentia constitutes the most fundamental composition found in every contingent 
being. In God, however, essence is identical with existence whereby He is the 
uncaused necessary Being, the ultimate source of existence, Ipsum Esse 
Subsistens.  
St. Thomas Aquinas insists that both esse and essentia are really 
distinguishable but they are not things in themselves. They remain in relation of 
act and potency with respect to each other. As Frederick Wilhelmsen puts it: 
”esse is absolutely prior, presupposing nothing, whereas everything else 
presupposes esse”, “esse is the being of things, their being composed: the esse of 
composite creatures is existential synthesizing activity”31. Esse is never a subject 
of its own, it is the synthesizing activity through which essential principles are 
composed into one being32. God, the Ipsum Esse Subsistens, is the ultimate 
source of esse while the creatures participate in this source by way of analogy. 
Insofar as esse is an act, it synthesizes essences into concrete beings33. Essence, 
on the other hand, specifies the mode of being of a thing from within thus 
establishing the said relation between the two as act and potency. Consequently, 
esse and essence can be looked upon as autodetermining principles.  
Wilhelmsen’s assertion that “human reasoning as creative synthesizing 
analogically mirrors or refracts the structure of being of St. Thomas Aquinas” 
provides a convenient bridge to Thomistic epistemology. This epistemology 
shares in the broader understanding of knowledge as the intentional presence of 
                                                 
27Aristotle, Post. Anal. II, 7. 
28Stanley L. Jaki, The Origin of Science and the Science of Its Origin, Edinburgh: Scottish 
Academic Press, 1978, pg. 11. 
29St. Thomas Aquinas, In VI Metaph., l.3., n.1220  
30St. Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia, Chp. 6. 
31F.D. Wilhelmsen, The Concept of Existence, in Being and Knowing, Albany – New York: 
PCP 1995. Here Wilhelmsen refers to the following original texts of St. Thomas Aquinas In I Sent. 
d. 19, q. 5, a.1., ad 7; In I Sent. d. 38, q.1, a.3.  
32St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 52; In Boethii de Hebdomadibus, lect.2. 
33St. Thomas Aquinas, De potentia Dei, q.7., a.2, ad.5.  
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a known object in the knowing subject by means of a mental representation34. As 
St. Thomas Aquinas explicates, the intelligibility of the created Universe arises 
only as deduced from the Cause of its being, that is God, and not as somehow 
implied in their natures35. In the act of cognition, the sensory material gathered 
by the senses is permeated by the light of the active intellect and through the 
process of abstraction achieves its final mode of being “other-as-other” when 
impressed upon the passive intellect36. Thus the idea of a cognized object is 
formed in human mind. At the same time, it is the reflection of a corresponding 
idea residing in the mind of God whereby human intellect participates 
analogically in the Divine intellect37. Thomistic epistemology bears radically 
existential character insofar as to know means to achieve a new mode of 
intellectual (intentional) existence conditioned entirely by the object of 
cognition38. Moreover, the human awareness of ego is concomitant to the act of 
cognition. This implies that without a single act of cognition directed towards 
objectively existing reality, man is unable to be aware of himself as a knowing 
subject, as an ego39. Consequently, the second fundamental trait of Thomistic 
epistemology is its entire dependence on the objective created order. Human 
intellect remains entirely transparent and passive in this process, namely, it 
contributes nothing of its own to the essential content transmitted through the 
external senses. St. Thomas Aquinas excludes any knowledge obtained through 
direct illumination, postulated in Platonic and Augustinian tradition40. By virtue 
of its very nature, the process of abstraction mentioned above makes human 
cognition fragmentary or, as it is often named, analogical. Lastly, abstraction 
leads to the dematerialization of the sensory content so that the very act of 
knowing – becoming other-as-other – is immaterial. This provides important 
evidence for St. Thomas to conclude that human beings are endowed with 
immaterial and immortal soul. 
Since it is the objectively existing reality that conditions the process of human 
cognition, human mind must exercise powers matching the structure of cognized 
things. They must fit as “a plug an outlet in order to make a good connection”. 
This means that the fundamental composition of all created things of esse and 
essence will be mirrored by two powers of human intellection, existential 
judgment (judicium) and simple apprehension (apprehensio simplex), 
                                                 
34J. Owens, Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry, Houston, Texas: The Center for Thomistic 
Studies 1992, pp. 167 – 186.  
35St. Thomas Aquinas, De potentia Dei, q.3., a.5, ad.1. 
36St. Thomas Aquinas, In III de anima, lect. 10,  Art. 738-9, Summa Theologiae I, q. 40, a.3, 
De veritate 10, 6, ad 7. 
37St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I q. 89, a.1. 
38St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I q.18, a.2. 
39St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sententiarum, 19, q.5., a.1c et ad 7; Summa Contra Gentiles, I c. 
59; De Malo, XVI, 6 ad 19. 
40St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I q. 84, a. 3 -5  
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respectively. Wilhelmsen will use the characteristics of these two powers with 
particular emphasis on that of judgment to evaluate the feasibility of artificial 
intelligence.  
In his commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate, St. Thomas Aquinas states that:  
The first operation of the intellect concerns the nature itself of the thing in 
respect to which the thing receives certain rank among these that exists either 
as a complete thing, like some whole, or as an incomplete one like a part or 
an accident. The second operation of the intellect regards the being itself of a 
thing that results from the union of principles of a thing in composite 
substances, or, as in the case of simple substances, accompanies the thing’s 
simple nature41. 
The first of the two operations of the human intellect, simple apprehension, is 
responsible for the understanding or apprehension of intelligible objects. It 
enables the intellect to know what things are, to know their essences. The second 
operation, judgment, serves to compose and divide what was grasped in simple 
apprehension. For example, the understanding of what “blue” and “sky” are 
allows the intellect to unite the two and affirm that “sky is blue” or having 
grasped what “sky” and “dog” are, divide the two by asserting that “sky is not a 
dog”. “In judgment, then, the intellect does not simply know what things are; 
rather, it grasps them in their very existence”42. When the human mind affirms 
that sky is blue, it understands how sky exists, that is as blue. When it judges 
that sky is not a dog, it comprehends how sky does not exist, it does not exist as 
a dog. Of course, human mind concludes based on the content of the combined 
propositions but it is only the “internal structure of the performance of 
reasoning”, there is no conceptual representation of why man concludes43. This 
content, however, has to be put into being by the internal activity of  the human 
intelligence, has to be turned into the “being-known” as a form of unity of 
predicate and subject. This unity is in no way reducible to what goes into it and 
new knowledge is attained in the synthesis of premises. However, it is not the 
synthesis itself but “the esse of synthesizing is the very act of concluding, of 
affirming or assenting to the new being of a predicate in a subject”44. This act is 
what one understands as truth in the Thomistic sense. Frederick Wilhelmsen 
                                                 
41St. Thomas Aquinas, In Boethii De Trinitate, q.5, a.3.: “Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam 
naturam rei, secundum quam res intellecta aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet, sive sit res 
completa, ut totum aliquod, sive res incompleta, ut pars vel accidens. Secunda vero operatio 
respicit ipsum esse rei, quod quidem resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis vel 
ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in substantiis simplicibus”. 
42A. Maurer, St. Thomas Aquinas: The Division and Methods of the Sciences. Questions V and 
VI of his Commentary on the De Trintate of Boethius translated with Introduction and Notes, 4th 
ed., Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1986, XVIII.  
43F. D. Wilhelmsen, Reasoning and Computers, in Being and Knowing, Albany – New York: 
PCP 1995, 178. 
44F.D. Wilhelmsen, op. cit., 177. 
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summarizes succinctly: “If radical existential activity is in every sense act and in 
no sense potency, then it follows that the efficient causation (Hume’s act of 
belief) of the being of integration or synthesis is not deducible formally from 
pre-existent knowledge but that it is totally new, creative, discontinuous”45.  
Although the length of the above metaphysical/epistemological rightly seems 
somewhat burdensome, it facilitates the evaluation of artificial intelligence in 
light of the scholastic philosophy proposed by Frederick Wilhelmsen. The core 
of the argument hinges upon the discussed distinction between the conceptual 
content of what goes into reasoning and the activity of the intellect that exercises 
the reasoning. Wilhelmsen states that it is exactly this conceptual content and 
formal relationships that can be “charted through psychological and electronic 
techniques”46. In other words, only the static component of human reasoning that 
comprises the cognitional content can be subject to algorithmization. What 
remains entirely beyond algorithmization is the very act by which reasoning is 
effected. This act introduces radical discontinuity into the process of human 
intellection so that newly achieved knowledge is not reducible to the conceptual 
content it has been achieved upon. A meaningful mental state is attained by the 
exercise of the entire complexus of cognitive powers of man. Semantics 
transcends the formal order of syntax. Consequently, scholastic epistemology 
presents human cognition as a complex process wherein one needs to probe into 
the nature of each of its constituents to account for its algortihmizability. 
Inasmuch as the static conceptual part can be “charted” (Wilhelmsen’s 
terminology), the dynamical part responsible for making the conceptual 
intentionally exist as known escapes translation into any computational 
language. Thus, it renders the strong hypothesis of the artificial intelligence not 
feasible. However, since the conceptual aspect of human thought, namely, its 
internal structure, can be algorithmically modeled, scholastic epistemology can 
be considered to corroborate the weak hypothesis of artificial intelligence. It is 
the very act of the doing of reasoning that cannot be modeled.  
 
In his reflections on mathematical truth, Roger Penrose writes:  
I think that Gődel’s Theorem clearly indicates that the notion of mathematical 
truth cannot be satisfactorily represented in any formal system. Mathematical 
truth exceeds the limits of pure formalism. … In mathematical truth, one can 
find something absolute and “given by God”47. 
Although the last sentence of the above quote is of rather theological nature 
and does not pertain to the scope of this study, Penrose’s claim of the formal non 
representability of the mathematical truth follows upon Alan Turing’s solution 
                                                 
45F.D. Wilhelmsen, op. cit., 179. 
46F.D. Wilhelmsen, op. cit., 178. 
47R. Penrose, op. cit., 134.  
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of Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem that there are no general algorithms 
permitting solutions of all mathematical problems. Also, Penrose’s insight in 
regards to the formulations of judgments as an exclusive manifestation of human 
consciousness seems to accord with the conclusions of this article. It is not 
possible to state whether such correlation is scientifically justifiable. As 
indicated by Frederick Wilhelmsen, the exploration of scholastic epistemology 
on the grounds of the works of St. Thomas Aquinas provides important means to 
probe into the nature of human reasoning in general. Indeed, some of the 
terminology used in scholastic philosophy is not entirely compatible with that 
used by contemporary cognitive science. Scholastic epistemology facilitates the 
understanding of the complexity of human thought by singling out processes of 
its internal structuring (conceptualization) as well as the very act by which 
reasoning is effected (judgment/synthesis). This accords with the increasing 
insistence of modern science on the existence of a non algorithmizable element 
of human reasoning. In particular, this approach sheds valuable light on the issue 
of artificial intelligence and the Chinese Room argument of John Searle. While it 
describes the origin and specificity of the non algorithmizable aspect of human 
thinking and thus contradicts the strong AI hypothesis, it thoroughly 
metaphysical nature makes the application of experimental methods of study 
quite limited. 
Does non alogithmizability means non rationality? It might. For as Frederick 
Wilhelmsen asserts in conclusion: “Lovers tell us – and the Thomistic tradition 
buttresses their conviction – love is non rational. Perhaps there is an even deeper 
irony: the non rationality of reason. A friend of the author recently won two 
thousand dollars playing blackjack against a computer. He did so by throwing 
away the book and trusting his own wits”48. 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 F. D. Wilhelmsen, op. cit., 179. 
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